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ABSTRACT
Ensuring that all supposedly valid configurations of a software
product line (SPL) lead to well-formed and acceptable products
is challenging since it is most of the time impractical to enumer-
ate and test all individual products of an SPL. Machine learning
classifiers have been recently used to predict the acceptability of
products associated with unseen configurations. For some configu-
rations, a tiny change in their feature values can make them pass
from acceptable to non-acceptable regarding users’ requirements
and vice-versa. In this paper, we introduce the idea of leveraging
these specific configurations and their positions in the feature space
to improve the classifier and therefore the engineering of an SPL.
Starting from a variability model, we propose to use Adversarial
Machine Learning techniques to create new, adversarial configu-
rations out of already known configurations by modifying their
feature values. Using an industrial video generator we show how
adversarial configurations can improve not only the classifier, but
also the variability model, the variability implementation, and the
testing oracle.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software product lines (SPLs) promise to deliver custom products
out of users’ configurations. Based on their specific needs, users
select some configuration options (or features) that are combined at
the implementation level for eventually deriving a desired software
product. Real-world SPLs offer hundreds to thousands of configura-
tion options through runtime parameters, conditional compilation
directives, configuration files, or plugins [2, 25].
The abundance of options can be seen as a standing goal of
an SPL, but it also challenges the engineering of SPLs. In partic-
ular, the configuration process can be tedious as combinations of
options might not be functionally valid or lead to unacceptable per-
formances (e.g., execution time) for a given product. It is extremely
painful for an end-user, an integrator or a software developer to
discover, late in the process (at compilation time or even worse at ex-
ploitation time), that her carefully chosen set of options is actually
invalid or non-acceptable (for whatever definition of acceptability).
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In fact, ensuring that all supposedly valid configurations of an
SPL lead to well-formed and acceptable products has been a chal-
lenge for decades [20, 36, 37]. For instance, formal methods (such
as model checking) and static program analysis have been devel-
oped [11–13, 21, 31, 34]. Dynamic testing is another widely used
alternative as it is sometimes the only way to reason about func-
tional and quantitative properties of product of an SPL. However, it
is most of the time impractical to enumerate, measure, and test all in-
dividual products of an SPL. As a result,machine learning (ML) tech-
niques are more and more considered to predict the behavior of an
SPL out of a (small) sample of configurations [18, 22, 26, 28, 29, 35].
In particular, ML classification techniques can be used to predict the
acceptability of unseen configurations – without actually deriving
the variants [32, 33]. A central problem then remains: the statistical
ML algorithm can produce classification errors (by construction).
Non-acceptable variants may still be generated out of supposedly
valid configurations; or invalid configurations actually correspond
to acceptable video variants.
Our intuition is that errors (if any) come from the proximity,
in the feature space, between non-valid and valid configurations.
This proximity may intertwine both acceptable and non-acceptable
configurations, increasing the complexity of ML functions separat-
ing the two configurations classes (acceptable or non-acceptable).
Prediction errors come from the fact that ML techniques are esti-
mators and might not be able to cope with this complexity. Our
idea is to exploit the estimator to find "blind spots" in the separat-
ing function and target these particular areas to better define the
separating function. It will improve the ML classifier associated to
an SPL and, thus, better capture the space of valid and acceptable
configurations.
We propose to use Adversarial ML (AdvML) techniques which
automatically create configurations that are specifically designed
to lie in areas of the configuration space where the confidence in
the ML decision is low (i.e., close to the boundary and thus where
valid and non-valid configurations are close). To our knowledge,
no works have used AdvML to reach the goal of improving an SPL.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
i) we motivate the problem with an industrial video generator; ii)
we describe a conceptual framework for SPL engineering in which
ML classifiers are central; iii) we introduce the idea of adversarial
configurations and detail how AdvML techniques are suited for
generating them; iv) we show that adversarial configurations can
help to improve not only the classifier of an SPL, but also the
variability model, the variability implementation, and the testing
oracle of an SPL (e.g., an industrial video generator).
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2 MOTIVATING CASE STUDY
We consider a representative SPL of our problem, an industrial video
generator called MOTIV (more details can be found in [1, 16, 33]).
The goal of MOTIV is to produce synthetic videos out of a high-
level, textual specification; such videos are then used to benchmark
Computer Vision based systems under various conditions. Variabil-
ity management is crucial to produce a diverse yet realistic set of
video variants, in a controlled and automated way.
MOTIV is composed of a variability model that documents pos-
sible values of 80 configuration options. Each option has an impact
of the visual characteristics on generated videos. There are Boolean
options, categorical (an enumeration) options (e.g., for including
fog or blur in a scene) and real-value options (e.g., to deal with
the amount of dynamic or static noise). To realize variability, the
MOTIV generator relies on Lua code that takes as input a con-
figuration file and produces a custom video file (see Figure 1). A
highly challenging problem of MOTIV is that, out of the ≈ 10100
possible configurations, some of the corresponding videos are not
acceptable. For example, there is too much noise or blur in some of
them; or additional objects, such as trees, obstruct the view to the
scene making the processing too difficult and unrealistic, etc.
To overcome this limitation, our early attempt was to rely on
ML classification techniques to predict the acceptability of unseen
video variants. We used an automated procedure (i.e., a testing
oracle) to compute and determine whether visual properties of
a video were acceptable. Learned constraints were extracted and
injected into the variability model to reduce its configuration space.
Despite good accuracy and interpretable results, errors remain –
supposedly valid configurations may still generate non-acceptable
video variants or invalid configurations actually correspond to
acceptable video variants. Thus, it is important to be sure that the
classifier does not have "blind spots" and that the decisions it makes
are as close as possible from the decision that the oracle would
make. Said differently, we want to reduce the number of errors
made by the classifier with regards to the oracle.
3 SPL ANDMACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIER
TheMOTIV case study is an instance of a more general problem.We
propose a conceptual SPL framework to describe the problem and
its entities. In particular, we show the central role of ML classifiers.
3.1 Basic SPL framework
Figure 1 depicts the different entities of the framework as we illus-
trate them on the MOTIV case.
Variability modeling. A variability model defines the configu-
ration options of an SPL; various formalisms (e.g., attributed feature
models, decision models) can be employed to structure and encode
information [4, 5]. A variability model typically defines domain
values over each configuration options allowing to bound values
that they can take. Moreover, as not all combinations of values are
permitted, it is common to write additional constraints between
options (e.g., mutual exclusions between two Boolean options).
A configuration is an assignment of values to every individual
options. Because of constraints and domain values, the notions of
valid and invalid configurations emerge. That is, some values and
combinations of configuration options are accepted while others
Variability 
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targets{
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}
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...
Attributes:
enum background.identifier 
['CountrySide', 'Desert', 'Jungle', 
'SemiUrban', 
'Urban', 'Mountain'] 
real distractors.bird_level [0.0 .. 1.0] real 
distractors.far_moving_vegetation [0.0 .. 
1.0] 
real distractors.blinking_light [0.0 .. 
1.0] ...
Constraints:
...
background.identifier=='CountrySide' -> 
vehicle.dust == vehicle.size
Figure 1: Software product line and ML classifier
are rejected. A satisfiability solver (e.g., SAT, CSP, or SMT solver)
is usually employed to check the validity of configurations and
reason about the configuration space of a variability model. Such a
reasoning procedure is usually sound and complete.
Variability implementation. Configurations are only an ab-
stract representation of a variant (or a product); there is a need to
shift from the problem space to the solution space and concretely
realize the corresponding variants with actual code. Different im-
plementation techniques can be used such as #ifdefs which give
instructions to the compiler or runtime parameters given to pro-
grams. In the case of MOTIV, the Lua generator uses different
parameters to execute a given configuration and produce a variant.
In some cases, configurations can lead to undesirable variants
despite being valid. For instance, in the case of MOTIV, some video
variants contained too much noise. The test oracle is a procedure
to determine whether a variant is acceptable or not. In Figure 1,
the oracle gives a label (green/acceptable or red/non-acceptable).
As the number of variants can be large, it is desirable, as often as
possible, to automate the procedure (e.g., with Unit test cases). In
the case of MOTIV, we can hardly ask a human to visually assess
all possible video variants. We implemented a C++ procedure for
computing visual properties of a video. If a variant is considered
non-acceptable by the oracle, then, there is a difference between
the decision given by the solver within the problem space and the
testing oracle within the solution space. Problems can occur in the
transformation from problem space to solution space: in particular,
the code can be buggy; the oracle can be hard to automate and
thus introduce approximations and/or errors; the variability model
might miss some constraints.
3.2 Machine Learning (ML) Classifier
So far, the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1 is rather
traditional. We now describe the role of ML classifiers.
Why ML classifiers are needed? A typical problem from SPL
engineering is to ensure the integrity between the problem space
and the solution space. That is, all valid configurations of the vari-
ability model in the problem space must be associated to an accept-
able variant in the solution space. In the case ofMOTIV, determining
whether a video variant is acceptable can only be done after the
2
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Figure 2: Adversarial configurations (stars) are at the limit
of the separating function learned by the ML classifier
derivation and through dynamic testing. Furthermore, it is most of
the time impossible to execute all configurations to assess whether
corresponding variants are acceptable or not. BeyondMOTIV, many
SPLs are in this situation: the configuration space is huge and dy-
namic testing can only be done over a small sample. ML techniques
are precisely here to generalize observations made over known
configurations to never-seen-before configurations.
MLclassifiers to predict the label of unseen configurations.
From a formal point of view: we consider a classification algo-
rithm f : X 7→ Y that assigns samples represented in a feature
space x ∈ X to a label in the set of predefined classes y ∈ Y . In MO-
TIV, only two classes are defined in Y = {−1,+1}: acceptable and
non-acceptable. The classifier f is trained on a dataset D sampled
from a variability model and constituted of a set of pairs (xi , yi )
of configurations defined in X and associated labels. The classifier
builds a separating function that can be later used to predict the
class of previously unseen configurations represented in the feature
space X . A testing oracle is used to compute and associate labels
to configurations in the training sample. When presenting unseen
configurations, a ML classifier will hopefully predict correct labels
without actually deriving corresponding variants.
Unfortunately, the separation can make prediction errors since
the classifier is based on statistical approaches and a (small) training
sample. Figure 2 illustrates a set of configurations (triangles and
squares) in a 2D space (i.e., one dimension represents one config-
uration option) that is used to learn a separation (shown as the
transition from the blue/left to the white/right area). The solid black
line represents the target oracle that the classifier is supposed to
fit. We can clearly see that the built separation is an approximation
of the target oracle as: going away from the center of the image,
the two functions diverge; two squares are already misclassified as
being triangles. The algorithm approximates as it tries to mitigate
the complexity of the function w.r.t. the number of errors it makes.
4 USING ADVERSARIAL ML
Principles. Our goal is to reduce the number of errors performed
by the classifier. A first, simple method is to pick random configu-
rations and, whenever a divergence happens between the decision
made by the classifier and the oracle, the configuration is added to
the training set with the label given by the oracle and build a new
classifier. Going further: after a random configuration have been
picked, the configuration is transformed into its associated variant.
Tests on this variant are executed and finally the oracle can decide.
In the end, because the configuration was chosen randomly, the
classifier cannot be exploited at all. Its predictions must be check
in order to know if it disagrees with the oracle to further retrain it.
Instead of randomly choosing configurations, we would like to
guide their generation to increase chances of obtaining a classifica-
tion error. Getting back to Figure 2, the notion of confidence in the
prediction emerges as the two classification errors are made. As
the two squares lie close to the separation and knowing that they
are misclassified (thanks to their real labels), the classifier will give
a low confidence in its decision. This piece of information can be
exploited to guide the generation of new configurations towards
similar areas where the confidence in the prediction is low.
This is somehow similar to Generative Adversarial Nets (GANs)
idea [17] as a classifier and adversarial configurations interact. How-
ever, instead of a generative model, we propose to use other AdvML
techniques in order to find "blind spots" in the classifier (i.e., poorly
explored areas in the feature space; areas with few known configu-
rations that are possibly far from each other). Specifically targeting
such areas in order to create new configurations and include them
into the training set will rise the confidence given into predictions
leading to fewer prediction errors.
Using evasion attack. Biggio et al. [6] present an AdvML tech-
nique, called evasion attack, that can be used after a classifier is
trained. Regarding some classifier implementations, confidence
values might not be directly retrieved and an estimate of the con-
fidence response has to be calculated. Then, a gradient descent
algorithm is used w.r.t. this estimation of the response in order to
target directly area of low confidence. Finally, attack points (i.e.,
copy of actual known configurations) are modified following the
gradient direction and become new configurations.
Adding these new configurations to the training set of the classi-
fier and retrain it might help constrain the space of acceptable vari-
ants as the classifier will perform fewer prediction errors and will
generally give a higher confidence in its predictions. It is important
to recall that this method does not choose randomly configurations
and it only exploits the classifier after it has been trained that does
not involve the use of the oracle. Getting back to Figure 2, using
an adversarial attack might create points lying around the points
distribution (i.e., central part of the image). For instance, we might
create adversarial configurations on the top and/or bottom parts
of the image, in areas where we can observe strong divergence
between the classifier and the oracle. The principle is shown by
the ⋆ configurations (representing initial and final positions of an
adversarial configuration). Taking these new configurations into
account by retraining the classifier, we force the reduction of the
gap between the two functions, in turn, reducing prediction errors.
Along with the attack, [6] proposes an adversary model stating
what an attacker knows about the system, how they can inter-
act with it, etc. This model has been created for general purpose,
however, in MOTIV, we have a complete control over the system.
Furthermore, we do not want to attack per se, we rather want to
improve the classifier using adversarial attacks. Thus, we conduct
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evasion attacks under perfect knowledge of the system (i.e., the
learning algorithm, used training set and feature representation).
Using evasion attack on a video generator. Coming back at
our video generator example presented, we apply AdvML and look
at "adversarial" videos that are produced. To do so, we reused video
configurations and labels presented in previous work [33].
The adversary’s goal is to consider one configuration at a time
and manipulates it (i.e., modify its feature values) such that it be-
comes misclassified. In particular, an adversary can target a specific
class for which the number of misclassification will increase.
We reimplemented the evasion attack presented in [6] in Python
using scikit-learn. As evasion attacks are based on gradient descent,
the separation of the classifier needs to be derivable. Decision Trees
(the classifier algorithm previously used in [33]) cannot be derived
so the classifier algorithm needs to be changed. We decided to
use Support Vector Machines (SVMs) instead as they have already
been studied under adversarial settings [6, 7, 9, 10]. Technically,
MOTIV defines 80 configuration options among which some are
categorical. As SVMs do not deal properly with this kind of features,
we transforming them into a set of Boolean ones. That is, for a
categorical feature proposing n choices, we produce n Boolean
features instead.
Now, we instantiate the adversary model to our case: the adver-
sary goal is to manipulate non-acceptable video configurations such
that they become acceptable w.r.t. the classifier. We have perfect
knowledge over the learning system and can directly manipulate
configuration options values (which acts also as feature values).
The number of adversarial configurations to create, the number of
transformations (i.e., iterations) and their "speed" are parameters
of the adversarial technique. The speed refers to the amount of
displacement allowed at each iteration. It is a common issue in gra-
dient based techniques as large displacements will get closer to the
objective faster but might not converge while small displacements
might lead to local optima in more iterations.
Preliminary results.We selected 10 configurations randomly
among the configurations that were considered non-acceptable
by the oracle. For each of these configurations, we compute the
gradient of the classifier function and move towards its direction
100 times with a displacement step equals to 0.002. Once those
10 new configurations have been generated, we add them to the
training set with the label of the initial configuration (i.e., non-
acceptable) and retrain the classifier such that it will take these new
information into account. We repeated this process of selecting 10
configurations, moving them and retraining the classifier 100 times.
Repeating the all process allows to select configurations added at
previous step as new starting configurations to run the attack. Even
if configurations generated in previous steps are selected, different
gradient directions can be followed as the training set has been
modified.This way, new areas of the configuration space can be
explored and, in the end, reducing potential errors while globally
increasing the confidence given in predictions.
Figure 2 exemplifies the creation of a new configuration follow-
ing the evasion attack algorithm. A configuration has been chosen
and copied (i.e., the star the closest to triangles is superimposed to
the triangle configuration), then, based on the SVM separation, a
gradient towards a low confidence area is computed The configura-
tion is modified iteratively such that it follows the gradient. The
successive modification are represented by the solid line until the
algorithm stops. The final configuration is represented by a new
star lying on top of red square configurations.
Figure 3 presents five images from five different adversarial
videos that have been generated using evasion attack. We can no-
tice that these videos have different visual properties which means
that the attack is able to consider and leverage several features.
Figure 3a shows an image where there is fog, dynamic noise and
the sky is very cloudy inducing less light and thus less contrast.
The combination of fog, increasing the difficulty to identify objects
in the background, and dynamic noise, a noise modifying differ-
ent pixels in each frame of the video, makes it difficult to extract
moving objects properly and, thus, to track them properly. On the
other hand, Figure 3b uses colors to make it more difficult for tech-
niques matching colors to compare moving objects and models.
In particular, this image shows unrealistic colors (the variability
model did not constrained the color distribution). Figure 3c uses a
heavy fog and over-exposure in order to reduce contrast and make
it difficult to distinguish anything in the background. Figure 3d uses
a combination of different specific properties presented in previous
images. Figure 3e changes illumination conditions to make it looks
like dark night. As illumination is poor, the whole image can be
compressed such that large homogeneous areas appear without in-
troducing much errors in the decompression step. In the end, large
blurred areas combined to poor illumination reduce contrasts and
thus makes it more difficult to detour objects and recognize them.
In addition, dynamic noise (which is superimposed to the image,
hence not compressed) makes it even more difficult to distinguish
anything, even close to the camera.
Capitalizing on adversarial videos. Our preliminary results
show that evasion attack is able to combine values such that con-
figurations will lie in new, unexplored areas. Because, they have
not been explored, they cannot be constrained properly, resulting
in poor confidence in the prediction of the classifier. A first atti-
tude for developers of the video generator is to include those new
configurations into the training set and re-train the classifier. Then,
and following this idea presented in [33], new rules for classifica-
tion can be extracted out of the new classifier and can be added as
constraints into the variability model. It will forbid to select configu-
rations that are likely to turn into non-acceptable variants. A second
possible exploitation of adversarial configurations is to engineer a
better testing oracle. Our manual review of videos indeed shows
the inability of our previous automated procedure to handle such
cases. In particular, we can try to break down the decision process
of our testing oracle into a combination of simpler procedures: a
first one dedicated to assess noise level, a second one regarding blur,
an other one focused on color distribution, etc. Overall, adversarial
configurations are helpful to improve the variability model and
the testing oracle. Finally, adversarial configurations can highlight
issues with variability implementation. However, in our experience,
the Lua code of MOTIV was not in question.
5 RELATEDWORK
Our work aims to support quality assurance of SPLs through the
use of ML techniques. Our contribution is at the crossroad of (ad-
versarial) ML, constraint mining, variability modeling, and testing.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 3: Examples of generated videos using evasion attack (a PDF reader is needed to appreciate the visual properties)
Use of ML and SPL. It has been observed that testing all config-
urations of an SPL is most of time impossible, due to the exponential
number of configurations. ML techniques have been developed to
ultimately reduce cost, time and energy of deriving and testing new
configurations using inference mechanisms. For instance, authors
in [18, 22, 26, 28, 29, 35] used regression models to perform perfor-
mance prediction of configurations that have not been generated
yet. In [33], we proposed to use supervised ML to discover and
retrieve constraints that were not originally expressed before in a
variability model. We used decision trees to create a boundary be-
tween the configurations that should be discarded and the ones that
are allowed. In this work, we build upon this work and follow a new
research direction with SVM-based adversarial learning. Siegmund
et al. [30] perform a review of ML approaches on variability models.
They propose THOR, a tool for synthesizing realistic attributed
variability models. An important issue in this line of research is
to assess the robustness of ML on variability models. Our work
specifically aims to improve ML classifiers of SPL.
In these bodies of work, none of them use adversarial ML neither
the possible impact that adversarial configurations could have on
the predictions. Our method introduces the use of evasion tech-
niques (that is a specific adversarial ML technique) in order to
specifically create configurations for "fooling" ML predictions. Such
configurations could be used in order to reinforce ML boundaries
and thus give more confidence in ML predictions. We also show
the possible impacts of adversarial configurations over variability
implementation and testing oracle (not only the variability model).
Adversarial ML is closely related to ML as it tries to better
understand flaws and weaknesses of ML techniques. Adversar-
ial ML can be seen as a field performing a security analysis of
ML techniques. This field has known great advances since the
early 2000’s with the breakthroughs of ML techniques in vari-
ous domains. Typical scenarios in which adversarial learning is
used are: network traffic monitoring, spam filtering, malware de-
tection [3, 6–10] and more recently autonomous cars and object
recognitions [14, 15, 19, 23, 24, 27, 38]. In such works, authors sup-
pose that a system uses ML in order to perform a classification task
(e.g., differentiate emails as spams and non-spams) and some mali-
cious people try to fool such classification system. These attackers
can have knowledge on the system such as the dataset that have
been used to train the ML classifier, the kind of ML technique that
is used, the description of data, etc. Based on that, they plan an
attack which consists in crafting a data point in the description
space that the system will mis-classify. Recent works [17] have
proposed to use adversarial techniques to strengthen the classifier
by specifically creating data that would induce such kind of mis-
classification. In this paper, we propose to use a similar approach.
However, SPLs do not suffer from an adversarial context per se.
The use of adversarial techniques is rather to strengthen the SPL
(including variability model, implementation and testing oracle
over products) while analyzing a small set of configurations. To
our knowledge, no adversarial techniques have been used in the
context of SPL or variability-intensive systems.
6 CONCLUSION
Machine learning techniques are more and more used in SPL en-
gineering as they are able to predict whether a configuration (and
its associated program variant) might be acceptable to end-users
and their requirements. These techniques are based on statisti-
cal properties which can lead to prediction errors in areas where
the confidence in the classification is low. We propose to bring
Adversarial Machine Learning techniques in the balance. Exploit-
ing knowledge over a previously trained classifier, they are able
to produce so-called adversarial configurations (i.e., even before
variants are created) in order to specifically target low confidence
areas. These techniques can help detecting bugs in the mapping
between configurations and actual program variants or discover ad-
ditional (missing) constraints in variability models. Our preliminary
experiments on an industrial video generator showed promising
results. As future work, we plan to compare adversarial learning
with traditional learning or sampling techniques (e.g., random, t-
wise). Another research direction is to use adversarial learning for
SPL regression (instead of classification) problem. In general, we
want to apply the idea of generating adversarial configurations to
SPLs that have large and complex configuration spaces.
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